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Abstract 
The abundance of retail stores in Japan compared to what is observed 
in the U.S. and elsewhere is due in part to legal obstacles to the open-
ing of large stores. These regulatory effects are measured by estimates 
of regression equations explaining variation in numbers of stores per 
household across Japan's 47 prefectures, and found not to be large enough 
to fully account for Japan's relative abundance of retail stores. A 
comparison of retailing cost data between Japan and the U.S. indicates 
that in Japan retailers' reorder costs are low. This and Japanese 
households' high storage costs imply that, apart from small but signif-
icant regulatory distortions, Japan's peculiar structure of retail trade 
is an efficient adaptation to the conditions of the country. In carrying 
out these investigations a new analytic model for explaining the geographic 
density of retail outlets in an economy is constructed. 
Why Are There So Many Retail Stores in Japan? 
David Flath* 
In Japan, small retailers are particularly common. In 1982 there were 
145.3 retail stores per 10,000 persons in Japan, compared to 82.9 for the 
United States, The similar statistics for the United Kingdom, France, and 
West Germany were 62.7, 74.8 and 67.0, respectively. That Japan's 
distribution system is inefficient for having so many stores has become a 
cliche that appears in academic and journalistic writing on Japan as well as 
in U.S. government position papers. 
There are two economic arguments on which the inefficiency claim has 
been based. One is the argument that Japan has a dualistic economy in which 
the distribution sector, unlike some other sectors, is economically 
backwards and riddled with anachronistic customs that have a cultural basis 
rather than an economic basis. In this view, the large number of stores in 
Japan is a symptom of economically wasteful overemployment in family 
enterprises, in Lewis' terminology: disguised unemployment. Patrick and 
Rholen (1987) have recently challenged the traditional dualism view, at 
least as regards current-day Japan, but only to replace it with an argument 
that is rather similar. They claim that those past retirement age 
(generally 55 years) and women are denied equal employment opportunities in 
anything other than family enterprise. Therefore they set up small stores 
(or become subcontractors) because economies of scale are least there and 
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the inefficiencies of their being prevented by discrimination from fully 
exploiting their comparative advantages will be minimized. If there were 
less discrimination against women and the aged, there would be fewer family 
enterprises in Japan and fewer small stores. 
The other inefficiency argument has to do with regulation. A 
succession of Japanese laws over the last half century have imposed 
bureaucratic obstacles to the establishment of large stores. The 
Department Store Act of 1937, which was suspended in 1947 and then 
reinstated in 1956, required approval of the national government (Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, prewar/Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, postwar) for the opening of new department stores anywhere in 
Japan. In 1973 the Large Scale Retail Store Act replaced the Department 
Store Act and made the extent of floor space of proposed stores, rather than 
the nature of the stores, the criterion for necessitating MITI approval. 
The cutoffs were 3000m^ in the largest cities and 1500m^ everywhere else; in 
fact almost all stores of larger floor space than these cutoffs had been 
department stores. Finally in 1978 this law was completely revamped so as 
to broaden its coverage to include all proposed new stores with floor space 
above 500m^. 
The entire process of reviewing an application to establish a new store 
takes about a year. Though the authority to approve new stores is vested in 
MITI, the statutes oblige MITI to consider the recommendations of locally 
constituted panels of consumers, businessmen, and academics, regarding not 
only whether to approve applications but also regarding floor space, hours 
and days of operation, and location of proposed new stores. The U.S. 
3Tamura (1981), pp.1-14, and Tsuruta (1980), pp.13-27. 
analogue to these laws is local zoning. But local zoning in the U.S has had 
an opposite effect on the structure of retailing to that of Japan's laws 
pertaining to large stores. By separating commercial establishments from 
residential areas, local zoning in the U.S. has tended to favor larger 
stores over smaller ones. Mills and Ohta (1972), p. 703. The Japanese laws 
favor small stores. 
The Japanese laws requiring government approval for opening large 
stores were lobbied for by the proprietors of small stores and passed for no 
reason other than the protection of the owners of small stores. McCraw and 
O'Brien (1986) place great emphasis on these laws as the explanation for the 
large number of retail stores in Japan. As evidence that the laws have 
seriously restricted the growth of large stores they cite the marked drop in 
number of applications to open new stores following the enactment of the 
1978 ammendments to the Large Scale Retail Store Act, to a mere trickle in 
1984 of less than 500 applications for permission to open stores with floor 
space in excess of SOOm^ in all of Japan, a country of 120 million persons. 
Tamura (1986), p. 86, cites the same evidence in making a similar argument. 
Though both the above arguments imply that there are more small stores 
in Japan than is economically efficient, they leave aside the question of 
just how many stores would be economically efficient. We ought to consider 
whether in the absence of regulation and labor market dualism there would be 
an inherent tendency in Japan for there to be many small stores. 
Efficiency justifications for the predominance of small retailers in 
Japan have been offered but have not been fully developed. For instance, 
several authors have suggested that the shopping behavior of households is a 
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crucial factor in explaining the abundance of small stores. According to 
Caves and Uekusa (1976), 
The low mobility of housewives has impelled many neighborhood 
stores that are necessarily small. Low household income and a 
lack of consumer durables (especially refrigerators) has meant 
frequent shopping trips and small-scale transactions--hostile 
to scale economies in store operation. (p. 116) 
Similar claims are made by Yoshino (1971): 
Limited income, lack of storage facilities, and the strong 
preference for freshness led housewives to make frequent 
shopping trips, sometimes several daily. And of necessity 
they had to confine themselves to neighborhood shops....Thus, 
the lack of consumer mobility and the need to shop frequently 
have provided a powerful rationale for the existence of a 
large number of small stores. (p. 23) 
It is natural to expect a link between shopping behavior and the 
geographic density of retail stores. The greater the density of stores the 
less is the distance from house to store for many consumers and the lower 
are the consumers' costs of making shopping trips. But the more retail 
outlets there are, the less are the scale economies in transporting goods 
from producers to retailers. There would seem to be social gains from 
having many retail outlets only if consumers' costs of storage and reorder 
are high relative to those of the retailers, that is if retailers' storage 
and reorder costs are low. In fact, a formal development of the argument 
confirms this intuition, and data suggest that in Japan compared to the 
U.S., households' storage costs are high and retailers' reorder costs are 
low, both of which favor more stores per person in Japan than in the U.S.. 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to constructing an analytic 
model for explaining the geographic density of retail outlets in an economy 
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and applying the model to the query in the title. In the analytic model, 
the number of stores that minimizes the consumers' and retailers' combined 
storage and reorder costs given the demand, is precisely related to cost 
parameters and to the geographic density of households. In a statistical 
model, variation across Japan's 47 prefectures in numbers of stores per 
household is explained both by proxies for household storage and reorder 
costs (tatami mats per person, motor vehicles per household, and fraction of 
population residing in densely inhabited districts) and by the severity of 
regulations impeding large stores (measured by number of department stores 
per household). Regulatory effects are well identified but not extremely 
large. This finding leads to a search for the additional factors underlying 
the relative abundance of retail stores in Japan. A comparison of retail 
cost data for Japan and the U.S. reveals that retailers' reorder costs are 
relatively lower in Japan than in the U.S. for most kinds of business. 
The main reason there are so many small stores in Japan is not 
regulation. Rather it is that, because Japan is geographically compact, 
retailers' reorder costs are small and households' storage costs are great. 
The abundance of small stores in Japan, broadly speaking, represents an 
efficient adaptation to the conditions of the country. 
1. A Model for Explaining the Density of Retail Outlets 
A. General Considerations 
Models that can explain the geographic density of retail outlets are an 
implicit feature of the spatial competition literature (Capozza and Van 
Order (1978), Salop (1979), Heal (1980), Novshek (1980)). My approach 
differs from that of the spatial competition literature in two ways. One is 
6 
that I assume that retailers, as well as households, have Baumol-type 
storage and reorder technologies, whereas in the spatial competition 
literature the technology of retailing usually is not specified except to 
assert that economies of scale are present. (Heal (1980) is a notable 
exception.) The purpose of my assumption is to introduce consumers' and 
retailers' inventory costs in a way that is informative but tractable. 
The other difference is that I assume that, except for regulatory 
effects, the geographic density of retail outlets minimizes the households' 
and retailers' combined storage and reorder costs. The spatial competition 
literature makes no such assumption. Indeed, a typical result of spatial 
competition models is that the socially optimal number of retail stores is 
attained only by the merest coincidence if at all. The reason for assuming 
social optimality is that it enables one to ignore the pricing behavior of 
the sellers. This is an advantage because (pure) Nash equilibrium mill 
pricing strategies need not exist in the environment I propose. The social 
optimality assumption amounts to the claim that retailing attains 
technological efficiency. 
B. Assumptions 
Households. Let households be uniformly arrayed with density D across 
an unbounded plane. 
Nondurable good. Suppose that each household consumes some nondurable 
good at rate q which is the same for all households and is independent of 
^On this point see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986). In their terminology, 
my model gives rise to "transportation costs" of consumers that are 
proportionate to the square root of the distance to the store for 
nondurables and proportionate to the distance to the store for durables, and 
"production costs" of stores that are proportionate to the square root of 
quantity supplied. 
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both the good's price and the household's storage and reorder costs. Let 
each household have storage costs equal to k per unit of average inventory 
of the nondurable good. Further, suppose that each time a household 
reorders it incurs costs equal to r times the distance from the household to 
the nearest retail outlet. We presume that each household chooses a 
frequency of reorder for the nondurable that minimizes its own storage and 
reorder costs. 
Durable good. Suppose that each household maintains a stock of some 
durable good equal to one unit of it and that it replaces the unit at the 
exogenously determined rate q which is the same for all households. Let the 
households not have storage costs for the durable. Households have no 
decisions to make regarding the durable good. 
Retailers. Retailers are uniformly arrayed across the plane, with density 
Di to be determined endogenously. For both nondurable and durable goods we 
suppose that the households' reorders are utterly unsynchronized so that 
each retailer's inventories are depleted at the continuous rate (D/D]^)q. 
For both types of good let retailers have storage costs K per unit of 
average inventory. Also, suppose that each time a retailer reorders he 
incurs costs equal to R, a constant. The uniform spatial density of 
retailers is endogenous and minimizes the global storage and reorder costs. 
C. Households' storage and reorder costs 
Nondurable good. The storage and reorder cost of an individual 
household distance t from the nearest retailer is 
(1) s(t) = M + rat , 
2 i 
where i = reorder quantity, which implies i/2 = average inventory and q/i = 
frequency of reorder. The household will choose i to minimize this cost. 
One easily finds that 
By the assumptions that households purchase from the nearest retailer and 
retailers are uniformly arrayed with mean density T>i, the market served by 
each retailer is hexagonal with area D^ and radius D^ /212-1/ . Thus the 
storage and reorder costs of all the DD]^"1 households served by the same 
retailer are 
A look at figure 1 ought to make the logic fairly transparent. To evaluate 
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(4), make the substitution y = x tan 8 , noting that (x^ + y^) 2 = x sec 0 , 
2 x 
dy = x sec 8 dd , and x tan 0 = 0 -»• 6 = 0, and x tan 6 = =j— -*• 0 = 30. Now 
we have 
The storage and reorder costs per household served by the retailer are 
from which we deduce that 
(6n) C (D ) = S ( D 1 } 
-1 DD 
« (,627)(2krq)ilD^ . 
Durable good. The reorder cost of an individual household is 
(3d) s(t) = rqt . 
By reasoning similar to that applied to the nondurable we deduce that the 
reorder costs per household for the durable are 
(6d) CoCDx) * (.377)rq D~^ 2 . 
D. Retailers' storage and reorder costs 
Both nondurable and durable goods. Each retailer serves D/D]^  households 
and incurs storage and reorder costs 
, -,
 N KL RDq (7) sl " 2~ + SI ' 
where (D/D]^ )q = rate of depletion of inventory, and L = reorder quantity. 
Each retailer chooses L so as to minimize its storage and reorder 
costs. One finds that 
,os
 T* _ / 2RDCL (8) L
* " J DXK 
so that 
Thus the retailer's storage and reorder costs per household are 
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For either type of good the global storage and reorder costs per household 
are 
(11) C(D!) = C0(D!) + CiCDx) . 
The density of retailers that minimizes this cost is that which equates the 
marginal reduction in the households' storage and reorder costs with the 
marginal increase in the retailers' storage and reorder costs. 
For nondurable goods the solution to (12) is 
Z 
3 
(13n) D* * (.213) ™ 
and for durable goods this is 
h 
(13d) D* « (.533) J& r 
F. Comparative statics 
The comparative statics of the model are easily deduced. For nondurable 
goods: 
dk V>i~ d r T>i~ dD DX 3 ' 
( 1 4 n )
 dD-jK
 = dDjR = 2 
dK Di dR D]_ " 3 * 
^ 1 S_
 = o dq Di_ 
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For durable goods: 
Exogenous changes that increase households' costs of storage and 
reorder induce an increase in the density of retail outlets, which 
economizes by shifting more of the storage and reorder costs onto the 
retailers. Exogenous changes that increase the retailers' costs of storage 
and reorder induce a fall in the density of retail outlets, which economizes 
by shifting more of the storage and reorder costs back to the households. 
Greater geographic density of households in a sense implies greater reorder 
efficiency of the representative household and induces a disproportionately 
small increase in the density of retail outlets. Geographic density of 
retailers of durable goods is less sensitive to variation in density of 
consumers than is that of retailers of nondurables. Density of retailers of 
durable goods, however, is sensitive to flow demand of the representative 
household, whereas density of nondurables retailers is not. 
Overemployment in family enterprises might be thought of as, in effect, 
lowering retailers' cost parameters R and K, inducing more outlets. In a 
global sense this phenomenon is wasteful (It is maintained that the families 
would be more productive in alternative pursuits), but from the view of 
consumers, the cost of physically transporting goods through the 
distribution system is made less by it. 
Regulation such as under Japan's Large Scale Retail Store Law can be 
treated as establishing lower bounds on the geographic density of retail 
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stores. The precise placement of this lower bound will reflect local 
political conditions. 
2. Empirical Estimation 
A. Geographic variation within Japan in number of stores per household 
To test the model and to quantify the effects of regulation on the 
numbers of stores of different kinds in Japan, I estimated the coefficients 
of regression equations in which the dependent variables were natural 
logarithms of the numbers of stores of each different kind per household in 
each of Japan's 47 prefectures in 1985. (See Appendix A for the sources of 
all data and see Appendix B for s.i.c. codes of the nine different kinds of 
business). I used two alternative measures of "numbers of stores". One was 
number of establishments classified as principally engaged in the respective 
kinds of business. The other measure was the number of establishments 
selling each commodity (including establishments principally engaged in 
other kinds of business) summed within kinds of business to create a measure 
of the average number of points of sale within each line of business. 
The independent variables in the regressions were the fraction of each 
prefectures' population residing in "densely inhabited districts," tatami 
mats per person, motor vehicles per household, and natural logarithm of the 
number of department stores per household. A tatami mat is a 3'X6'straw mat 
and is the unit of measurement for the floorspace of houses and apartments 
in Japan. For nondurable goods, tatami mats per person are intended to 
represent household storage costs per unit of average inventory: the greater 
the living space, the lower the storage costs. Motor vehicles per household 
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are intended to represent household reorder costs: families with motor 
vehicles have lower reorder costs than do families without vehicles. These 
variables are also included in the regression equations for durable goods 
retailers. Fraction of the prefecture's population residing in densely 
inhabited districts is a proxy for population density. Number of department 
stores per household in each prefecture is taken as an indication of the 
severity of local application of the Large Scale Retail Store Law; if the 
local opposition to new department stores is strong one expects to see fewer 
department stores and more other stores. 
Results are reported in Table 1. The ln(points-of-sale/household) 
model performed rather better than the ln(establishments/household) model, 
but results were similar for both. The only kind of business that neither 
model at all fit was "general merchandise", i.e. department stores. This 
might be a reflection of regulatory effects. For the other kinds of 
business the model performed well. As the analytic model had enabled us to 
predict, the population density variable was inversely related to retailers 
per household and the size of the effect generally was estimated to be 
larger for nondurables than for durables. Also as predicted, for 
nondurables other than gasoline, the tatami mats per person variable and 
motor vehicles per household variable were inversely related to retailers 
per household, where significant. For durables and for gasoline, these 
variables were positively related to retailers per household, where 
significant. I would explain this last result as due to tatami mats per 
person being related to the scale of flow demand for apparel and furniture, 
and motor vehicles per household being related to the geographic density of 
households actually demanding gasoline or cars. 
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The coefficients on the logarithm of department stores per household do 
generally support the claim that bureaucratic obstacles to the opening of 
department stores have acted to increase the numbers of small stores. The 
elasticity of number of other stores to the number of department stores 
ranges from essentially zero in the case of motor vehicles, gasoline, and 
drugs and toiletries, to minus ten percent to minus twenty percent in the 
case of food, liquor, and apparel. There are about five times as many food 
stores per household in Japan as in the U.S. but only about one fifth as 
many department stores per household. (See Table 2). Can we say that if in 
Japan there were five times more department stores there would be four 
fifths fewer food stores? According to the estimated coefficient for food 
stores the answer is no. We would observe about one fourth fewer food 
stores. I conclude that while the cross-sectional evidence does demonstrate 
that regulation has contributed to the proliferation of small stores in 
Japan, regulation is not the only nor most important factor in explaining 
why there are so many small stores in Japan. To identify other important 
reasons for the Japanese structure of retailing I turn to a Japan-U.S. 
comparison of households' and retailers' costs. 
B. Japan-US variation in storage and reorder costs 
First, the generally higher population density of Japan would seem to 
favor fewer retailers per household than in the U.S., which is quite the 
opposite of what is observed for most kinds of business. See the first 
column of Table 2a and of Table 2b for numbers of retailers engaged in each 
kind of business per household in Japan and the U.S. 
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Second, any tendency towards greater division of labor within Japanese 
households than in American ones, with greater specialization in shopping in 
Japan, would tend to lower the reorder costs of households there (lower r), 
inducing fewer stores, not more. To the extent Japanese derive pleasure 
from shopping, this too lowers the households' reorder costs and has similar 
effects. 
Third, the generally cramped living conditions and consequently high 
storage costs of nondurable goods for Japanese households (high k), would 
tend to favor more nondurables retailers in Japan, if the ultimate cause of 
the cramped living conditions, the high land prices, did not also cause 
retailers to have proportionately higher storage costs (high K). The 
positive sign on "tatami mats per person" in the nondurables retailers 
regressions, does indicate sensitivity of numbers of stores to households' 
storage costs, within Japan. Also, data to be described below indicate that 
retailers' storage costs are not very different between Japan and the U.S.. 
High household storage costs probably are a factor in explaining why there 
are so many more (nondurables) retail stores per person in Japan compared to 
the U.S.. 
Finally, the relative magnitudes of storage and reorder costs of 
Japanese and American retailers can be inferred from available data. 
Assuming optimizing behavior by retailers as described in Section ID, one 
easily finds that each retailer's storage and reorder costs divided by two 
times his average inventory equals his storage cost per unit of average 
inventory. That is, 
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By this logic retailers' operating costs divided by two times the value of 
average inventory measures the storage cost per unit of average inventory 
relative to unit value of inventory. These data are reported for Japan and 
the U.S. by kind of retail business in the second column of Table 2a and of 
Table 2b (see Appendix A for sources). For most businesses, storage costs 
per unit seem to be relatively greater in Japan than in the U.S., but the 
difference is not large. 
Also assuming optimization by retailers, average inventory divided by 
quantity sold in a year equals the cost of a single reorder relative to the 
total storage and reorder costs for the year. In the earlier notation, 
(16) L*/2
 = R . 
(D/D!)q ~s| 
By this argument, and assuming that inventory is valued approximately at 
retail price, the value of average inventory divided by annual sales 
measures the cost of a single reorder relative to total operating cost. 
These data are reported for Japan and the U.S. in the last columns of Tables 
2a and 2b. The statistic is generally quite a bit lower for Japan than for 
the U.S. and, with the exception of Drugs and Toiletries, is lower for each 
kind of business separately. An obvious reason for lower reorder costs in 
Japan than in the U.S. is that Japan is geographically compact; the distance 
from producer or wholesaler to retailer is therefore relatively small. An 
additional reason might be the abundance of displaced workers available for 
family enterprise; through their efforts transport costs might be reduced. 
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3. Conclusion 
The more retail stores there are, the shorter is the distance from 
house to store for the representative consumer but the less are the scale 
economies in restocking the stores. Thus having more stores shifts 
inventory costs from consumers to retailers. In general this becomes 
socially optimal only if retailers are efficient at storage or reorder 
relative to the households, or if the geographic density of households is 
small. 
Bureaucratic obstacles to the establishment of new department stores 
have increased the numbers of small stores in Japan, but not to a sufficient 
extent that this can be the main reason there are so many more stores per 
household in Japan than in other countries. Compared to the U.S., it seems 
that in Japan households' storage costs are high and retailers'reorder costs 
are low. These conditions both favor more stores per person. In this sense 
an abundance of small stores in Japan is an efficient adaptation to the 
conditions of the country (including the social conditions that channel 
displaced workers into family enterprise and perhaps contribute indirectly 
to lowering retailers' reorder costs). 
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Appendix A. DATA SOURCES 
Japan 
1. Fraction of population in each prefecture residing in densely 
inhabited districts ("area within the boundary of a city, town, or 
village which is composed of a group of contiguous census enumeration 
districts with high population density (in principle, 4,000 
inhabitants or more per square kilometer) and constitutes an 
agglomeration of 5000 inhabitants or more") in 1980. 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Japan 
Statistical Yearbook. 1984, Table 2-6, pp. 30-31. 
2. Number of private households in each prefecture in 1980. 
Source: Ibid.. Table 2-21, p. 49. 
3. Tatami mats per person in each prefecture in 1980. 
Source: Ibid.. Table 15-1, p. 512. 
4. Motor vehicles owned per household in each prefecture in 1980. 
Source: Ibid.. Table 15-27, p. 545. 
5. Number of retail establishments engaged in each kind of business in 
each prefecture in 1985 . 
Source: Research and Statistics Department, Minister's Secretariat, 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Census of Commerce 1985. 
Volume 2, Report by Industries (Prefectures), Table 2, pp. 20-259. 
6. Number of establishments selling each commodity, summed within each 
line of business (to create a measure of the average number of points 
of sale within each line of business) in each prefecture in 1985. 
Source: Census of Commerce 1985, Volume 4, Report by Commodities, Table 
2, pp. 362-631. 
7. Total sales and total operating expenses of incorporated retail 
establishments engaged in each kind of business in 1985 and number of 
such establishments. 
Source: Census of Commerce 1985. Volume 1, Report by Industries 
(Summary), Table 14, pp. 356-375, 
8. Total sales and value of merchandise inventory of all retail 
establishments (incorporated or unincorporated) engaged in each kind 
of business in 1985, 
Source: Ibid.. Table 4, pp. 38-76. 
United States 
9. Sales, inventories, and operating expenses in 1982 for retail 
establishments with payroll, engaged in each kind of business. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1982 Census of 
Retail Trade. Industry Series, "Measures of Value Produced, Capital 
Expenditures, Depreciable Assets, and Operating Expenses," Table 1, 
pp. 2-4. 
10. Total number of households in the United States in 1980. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S.. 1986. Table 59, p. 42. 
(= 80,776,000) 
11. Number of retail establishments engaged in each kind of trade in the 
United States in 1982. 
Source: Ibid.. Table 1396, p. 775. 
Appendix B. KINDS OF RETAIL BUSINESS, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Figure 1. Storage and reorder costs of households 
served by the same retailer 
Table la. Coefficients from ln(points-of-sale/households) Models: Japan 
Table lb. Coefficients from ln(establlshiients/households) Jfodels: Japan 
Table 2a. Retailing Data: Japan and the U.S. 
Table 2b. R e t a i l i n g Data 
